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The Global Command and Control System (GCCS) is currently operational in the
Secure Systems Technology Laboratory located in Root Hall at the Naval
Postgraduate School. All subsystems of GCCS are operational with the exception of
the Automated Message Handling System (AMHS). The SSTL's efforts to obtain
an operational GCCS AMHS depends on the future availability of the Automated
Defense Information Network (AUTODIN), and the emerging technology of the
Defense Message System (DMS). This thesis examines and compares GCCS AMHS
and DMS and the implementation requirements for each. This thesis draws the
conclusion that DMS is the dominant system over GCCS AMHS and continues to
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For over thirty years, the standard element in organizational messaging DoD
wide has been the Automated Digital Network (AUTODIN). 1 AUTODIN supports
Multi-level Security (MLS); in other words, it supports all levels of message security
classifications. Although AUTODIN is a trusted communication system (i.e., it is
secure), the overhead required to maintain and operate the system and its aging
mainframe technology make the system expensive and slow.
In the late 1980's and early 1990's, computer based technological developments
made it possible to modify or replace AUTODIN messaging. Some of the
developments use PC/UNIX based software and the AUTODIN backbone and to
automate inbound and outbound message processing, while other systems are used
for inbound message dissemination only. Still, another technology once fully
implemented would not use AUTODIN at all. These new systems will be discussed
later in this thesis. The remainder of this chapter presents the statement of the thesis
problem, the purpose and scope of this research, and outlines the organization of this
study.
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT
The Secure Systems Technology Laboratory (SSTL) is located in Root Hall at
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). In December 1995, the Global Command and
Control System (GCCS) was installed in the SSTL to provide NPS students and other
users (e.g. Reserve units) real-time warfighting experience. The GCCS installed in
the SSTL is the same GCCS installed at CINC sites and could serve as an alternate
or additional operational CINC site. The NPS GCCS site will also be used by
students to participate in CINC level exercises (eg., to role play non-participating
AUTODIN is a worldwide, computerized general purpose communications system
based on mainframe technology. It provides for the transmission of both narrative and data
pattern official organizational messages on a store-and-forward basis.
commands or to act as observers/evaluators for the CINC). Additionally, selected
reserve components use the NPS GCCS site to conduct operational training prior to
supplementing GCCS equipped CINC command centers.
GCCS is comprised of several subsystems to support the Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, and Intelligence for the Warrior (C4EFTW) concept.
All of the subsystems installed on the SSTL's GCCS are operational with the
exception of its Automated Message Handling System (AMHS). GCCS AMHS is
designed to automatically send and receive UNCLASSIFIED to SECRET
organizational messages (using the AUTODIN backbone). The SSTL has a
requirement to receive high precedence, classified organizational messages, therfore
it needs to implement an operational automated messaging system for the installed
GCCS.
B. PURPOSE OF RESEARCH
This thesis is conducted to examine the most viable message handling
technologies available to support the SSTL's GCCS.
C. DISCUSSION
Emerging information technologies of the 1990's have spawned several
significant events that have an impact on the type of messaging capability to be
chosen for the SSTL's GCCS. These events are not all Navy or NPS unique thus all
DoD services and agencies have similar experiences. The events are as follows:
1. The closure of NTCC Monterey in 1993 eliminated direct NPS
AUTODIN access.
2. Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I) 9 March 1995 mandated closure
ofAUTODIN by year 2000 is changing the methods in which the DoD
must handle its message traffic [Ref. 14].
3. The Development of the Defense Information Infrastructure (DH) has
highhghted the need for DoD communications systems to become more
integrated.
4. The DOD's transition to the Defense Message System will lessen the
reliance on AUTODIN as a messaging system.
These problematic events are discussed in greater detail later in the thesis.
D. SCOPE
This thesis is limited in scope to the requirements and information needed to
provide the SSTL's GCCS with a viable automated message handling system.
Specific communication systems, methods, and policy at the DISA, DoN, and NPS
level will be discussed to provide clarity, understanding, and examine interoperability
issues. GCCS AMHS and DMS are discussed and compared in-depth to the DoD's
messaging requirements, however, the chapters that follow examine and compare only
the messaging technology deemed best for the SSTL.
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
The study's chapters present the following information:
Chapter I introduces the problem, purpose and scope.
Chapter II is a communication systems overview of GCCS, GCCS
AMHS and DMS.
Chapter HI introduces the current procedures by which NPS receives
external message traffic.
Chapter IV examines the specific hardware and software requirements
of the GCCS Automated Message Handling System.
Chapter V examines the specific hardware and software requirements
of the Defense Message System.
Chapter VI provides a functional comparison of GCCS AMHS and
DMS.
Chapter VII discusses DMS acquisition and procurement costs for the
SSTL.
Chapter VIII discusses the conclusions reached as a result of the study.
Chapter IX contains recommendations for further areas of study and
closing remarks.
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II. COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS REVIEW
This chapter provides a general discussion ofGCCS, GCCS AMHS, and DMS
to lay a foundation for comparison and selection of the best messaging system for the
SSTL.
A. GLOBAL COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM (GCCS)
The GCCS is a family of applications built to achieve two main objectives:
(1) to replace the aging mainframe based Worldwide Military Command and Control
System (WWMCCS) and (2) to begin implementation of C4I for the Warrior
(C4IFTW) concept [Ref. 1]. GCCS, when fully activated will offer the warfighter
highly mobile, deployable, command and control (C2) with a fused, real-time, true
representation of the battle space. The system will be a comprehensive, global system
that provides warfighters with required flexible and interoperable command and
control, anytime and anywhere. GCCS uses the Secret Internet Protocol Routed
Network (SIPRNET) - the secret portion ofthe Defense Information System Network
(DISN)- for intersite connectivity. This joint-service data network provides DoD with
a faster, smarter central nervous system. GCCS also receives information from
tactical communications systems, which are physically connected to individual GCCS
nodes within the larger network ofGCCS sites (i.e. mobile). GCCS passed its Initial
Operational Capability (IOC) test in August 1996. In its current version it offers the
warfighter much more capability than WWMCCS, but is only at the first of many
steps in achieving full implementation of C4IFTW.
To gain a better understanding of GCCS, the following scenario is provided
[Ref. 2]:
A simplified GCCS command center equipped with two projection
panels and 10 workstations responds to a military crisis (in the
fictitious region known as the Southern Coast of California).
Commanders tap into the Joint Defense Intelligence Service (JDIS)
application to get detailed information about enemy troop placements,
weapon capabilities and the like.
Using the DoD INTELINKS, a graphical intelligence network interface
based on the World Wide Web (WWW), commanders access
operational secret level homepages to view detailed photographs of
enemy tanks, recent satellite images showing their movements and
thousands of other bits of intelligence pulled from DISN's SIPRNET.
Needing a near-real time tactical display, the Common Operation
Picture (COP) application from the chart portion of the Joint Maritime
Command Information System (JMCIS)2 is used to display regional
maps with icons representing the location of both enemy and U.S.
military assets. A click on a particular icon produces a screen with
detailed descriptions of units, equipment and the location of those
assets. This data overlays digital maps downloaded from Defense
Mapping Agency (DMA) databases.
After assessing the operational situation, an additional set of Joint
Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) based GCCS
applications help commanders develop courses of action. For example,
the use of Global Status Of Resources and Training System (GSORTS)
indicates which U.S. troops and weapons are ready for deployment,
while the Scheduling and Movement (S&M) System determines the
best way of getting units to the theater of war on time. Numerous
messages are sent up and down the chain of command using the GCCS
AMHS for organizational messages and the GCCS E-mail application
for individual messages.
Future GCCS applications, such as the Logistics Anchor Desk and the
Medical Anchor Desk, will serve as funnels for coordinating more
detailed activities with thousands of offices and units in the field.
GCCS is the first system to use a DoD mandated joint Common Operating
Environment (COE).3 GCCS integration emphasizes the use of commercial-off-the-
shelf (COTS) products and merges the capabilities of a Local Area Network (LAN),
2JMCIS currently typically provides near real-time location ofNaval Units.
3Common Operating Environment refers to a core group of software functions shared
by multiple applications
UNIX-based client/server architecture, desktop-style Graphical User Interface (GUI),
and Relational Data Base Management Systems (DBMS) [Ref. 3].
The GCCS client/server architecture provides a foundation for linking external
systems and GCCS components, permitting easy access to applications, and faster,
more reliable data transfers within a secure environment.
At the core ofGCCS are large databases and application servers connected to
a secret LAN. The GCCS LAN interconnects GCCS servers with a variety of client
workstations such as PC DOS, MicroSoft windows for PCs, Macintosh, UNIX and
other X Windows clients, that run server-based software and application packages.
The GCCS LAN also connects with secret Wide Area Networks (WANs) supporting
standard LAN design (currently the SIPRNET).
B. GCCS AUTOMATED MESSAGE HANDLING SYSTEM (AJTfflS)
Since the early 1990's, a variety of Automated Message Handling Systems
(AMHS) have been used to automate and enhance traditional methods of sending,
receiving, and storing official AUTODIN messages at different security levels within
the DoD. AUTODIN is the baseline messaging environment of DoD and its
processes will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter HI.
One application ofAMHS, specifically the one used by EUCOM, was chosen
under the GCCS Best of Breed concept to be the basis for the GCCS AMHS. 4 This
AMHS is integrated into the GCCS COE with several other COE functions as shown
in Figure 2.1.
4GCCS AMHS installed in the SSTL processes UNCLASSIFIED TO SECRET
messages. It was developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA)











































Figure 2.1. GCCS Common Operating Environment
GCCS AMHS is a front end system to AUTODIN and as such, requires an
AUTODIN feed directly to the user's command.
As an extension ofAUTODIN, GCCS AMHS uses knowledge based tools and
COTS products to accelerate message handling processes and procedures. GCCS
AMHS provides three basic functions [Ref. 4]:
(1) Automated receipt, storage, and distribution to the user ofAUTODIN
messages.
(2) Retrospective search and recall of stored messages (60 days,
configurable).
(3) Support for generating, verifying, approving and transmitting
AUTODIN messages.
C. DEFENSE MESSAGE SYSTEM (DMS)
DMS consists of all hardware, software, procedures, standards, facilities, and
personnel used to exchange messages electronically between organizations and
individuals in the DoD. DMS is designed to provide organizational message and
electronic mail (E-mail) service to all DoD users and access to and from worldwide
DoD locations. It will also provide interfaces to other US Government, allied, tactical,
and Defense contractor users as needed. This will be achieved by compliance with
X.400/X.500 international standards for digitally switched messages. 5 DMS is based
upon the principles of standardization and interoperability with other DISA systems
such as GCCS (Figure 2.2).



























Figure 2.2. DISA's Interoperability
DMS' objectives are to meet DoD requirements for secure, accountable, and
reliable, writer-to-reader message services at all classification levels (unclassified to
5X.400 and X.500 are international standard protocols developed by the International
Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (CTTII). X.400 provides a store-and-
forward message handling system in a multi-vendor environment. X.500 provides for
directory services for electronic mail.
TOP SECRET/SCI), to the warfighter as a replacement for and improvement over
AUTODIN. All components ofDMS will consist ofreadily available COTS products.
In its transition stages, DMS will interoperate with current message systems (such as
AUTODIN) as they evolve from current configurations to full implementation.
Basic functions ofDMS include [Ref. 5]:
(1) Secure support for automated receipt, storage and distribution ofDMS
messages at all classification levels.
(2) Secure support for generating, verifying, approving and transmitting
DMS messages.
(3) The ability to provide a single capability to the end user (writer/reader)
for organizational (official) and individual (E-mail) messaging.
(4) Secure support for directory services to ensure messages are properly
addressed and reach the correct destination.
During the DMS implementation period, classified local systems like GCCS
will maintain their required connectivity via the SEPRNET, and unclassified local
systems will maintain their connectivity via NIPRNET through appropriate filters in
their individual firewalls. As more local systems become DMS equipped, the
AUTODIN system and the use of the SEPRNET will be fully merged into DISN [Ref.
6]-
D. MESSAGE HANDLING FUNCTIONALITY
DMS is an improvement over AUTODIN-based systems. Not only does its
protocol allow for more efficient transmission of data, voice, video and multi-media
products, but also provides the functionality of an AMHS. Specific functional
characteristics ofAMHS and DMS and their integration with GCCS will be discussed
in Chapter VI.
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m. CURRENT MESSAGE SERVICE
In this chapter, the discussion provides a historical perspective of
communications systems and discusses systems that are currently in use by the Naval
Postgraduate School (NPS) and requirements for the Secure Systems Technology
Laboratory (SSTL).
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The standard element in organizational messaging across the DoD is the
Automated Digital Network (AUTODIN). Since the 1960's, the Department of the
Navy has used AUTODIN as the backbone for delivery of organizational General
Service (GENSER) Messages. AUTODIN Switching Centers (ASC's), are main
"connectors" in the AUTODIN system that route GENSER messages from other
ASC's within a designated geographical area. Baseline AUTODIN included 15
operational ASCs located throughout the continental U.S. and overseas [Ref. 7]. Once
the message leaves the ASC it is routed to an Automated Message Processing
Exchange (AMPE) or a Naval Telecornmunications Center (NTCC). An AMPE
serves as an extension of an ASC. AMPEs provide limited switching functions in the
same manner of an ASC as well as conversions of destination Plain Language
Addresses (PLA) into internal AUTODIN addresses (routing indicators) and
distribution determination of messages. An NTCC, is the interface for entry and exit
of messages to and from AUTODIN for organizations located in its geographical
vicinity. NTCCs provide over-the-counter message service (sending and receiving)
to its assigned organizations. AUTODIN messages received by an NTCC are
duplicated and distributed on paper or floppy disks (since 1990 paper has been
gradually replaced by disks as the preferred medium). A courier from an organization
must physically pick up copies of incoming messages or drop off outgoing messages
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at the NTCC. In recent years, many NTCCs have closed in favor of AUTODIN
message service using the GateGuard system described in the next section.
B. MESSAGE SERVICE AT NPS
Since the closing ofNTCC Monterey in 1993, GENSER messages at NPS are
delivered and sent via GateGuard. 6
GateGuard is the first DoN message system to fulfill the objective of
electronically extending messaging services to the user level [Ref. 8]. GateGuard is
a program installed on a PC that serves as an AUTODIN interface point for NPS.
GateGuard is approved to process Unclassified-but-Sensitive through TOP SECRET
messages. The system at NPS processes messages through SECRET. NPS messages
received at NTCC Oakland are transferred electronically (downloaded) by the NPS
Classified Message Manager (CMM) to the GateGuard using a STU-HI phone.
Incoming unclassified messages are taken of! the GateGuard PC and moved onto a
second PC installed with the Message Dissemination Subsystem (MDS) program.
The MDS PC is connected to the NPS LAN and distributes these incoming
unclassified messages to the designated department or individual [Ref. 9]. Classified
messages are moved from the GateGuard PC onto disk. A courier from the Sensitive
Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) picks up the disk, takes it to the SCEF
and prints the messages from the disk. A SCIF staffmember cleanses the disk and the
courier delivers the disk and hard copies of the classified messages to the CMM. The
CMM then notifies the message recipient for pick-up.
Outgoing unclassified messages are delivered to the NPS CMM by courier.
Outgoing messages are given to the CMM on disk with an accompanying paper copy
of the message containing the releasing authority's signature. The CMM sends the
6GateGuard is a DMS transitional system that enabled the closing ofNTCC Monterey.
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message through GateGuard via STU-IH to Oakland NTCC to be release to
AUTODIN. Outgoing classified messages are drafted on a classified PC using a
Message Text Format Editor (MTF). The disk and hard copy (with releasing
authority's signature) are hand carried to the Classified Materials vault for release via
GateGuard [Ref. 9].
C. MESSAGE SERVICE FOR THE SSTL
AUTODIN Message Service in the SSTL is currently non-existent. However,
up to Secret Level E-mail to SEPRNET users is available. The SSTL is not connected
to the NPS LAN therefore, it does not receive unclassified messages using the MDS
program. Any classified messages received for the SSTL must be picked up by
courier from Classified Materials vault.
13
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IV. AMHS REQUIREMENTS FOR THE SSTL
This chapter examines the specific software and hardware requirements for the
SSTL to operate a functional GCCS AMHS using AUTODIN lines. GCCS AMHS
is a functional system at various GCCS sites world wide, therefore the discussion in
this chapter written in present tense. The GCCS AMHS Administration Manual for
Solaris [Ref. 4] was used as the basis for this chapter.
A. GENERAL BACKGROUND
Before a message arrives at the SSTL, it must be transmitted through
AUTODIN (Figure 4. 1). The GCCS AMHS infrastructure begins at the physical point
where the AUTODIN feed stops. The feed connects directly into the GCCS Data
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Figure 4.2. AMHS Functional Block Diagram
The GCCS AMHS architecture is designed to fit the size of the site in which
it is to be installed. The SSTL, considered a small site due to its anticipated low
AUTODIN traffic load,7 requires a single server, that can support all or some GCCS
COE components and applications, including GCCS AMHS.
In Chapter n, Part B, the basic functions of GCCS AMHS were described.
These same functions can now be described in terms of the specific hardware and
software required for the SSTL. The AMHS GCCS [Ref. 7]:
(1) Accepts messages via the Standard Automated Terminal/
Communications Support Processor (CSP) Backside Terminal
(SAT/CBT) from the AUTODIN Switching Center, decrypts the
messages, and stores them in file system drive on the GCCS AMHS
Server. The messages are routed by the GCCS AMHS Server over the
secret LAN to the appropriate recipients (when logged into client
machines) based on predeterrnined profiles and criteria using the
TOPIC software program.
(2) Assists users who author messages through the Message Text Format
(MTF) Editor, then routes them for approval through the Message
Manager (MM). Once approved, the MM releases messages with
format validation, to the AUTODIN switch via the Releaser program
of the MM and the SAT/CBT.
7
Traffic load determined by Ref. [19 ].
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(3) Searches for key words in a message database using the TOPIC
retrospective search tools to locate any message that relates to user-
defined criteria (this can be both address and/or content).
Specific explanations of software and hardware requirements are discussed in
the next section.
B. SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS
GCCS AMHS requires a number of software programs to assist in the message
handling process.
1. COTS Verity TOPIC is used as the GCCS AMHS text profiler and
retrieval database engine. It provides access to incoming AUTODIN
messages, notification to the message writer that the message has been
released (called come back copies) and coordination traffic. As
messages are received, they are put into the message database based on
discretionary access control (DAC) filters. Upon message queue
delivery, users can query the database using the TOPIC Query
Manager.
2. Message Manager (MM) provides the capability to create or retrieve a
message, modify the textual content of the message, and transmit that
message to one or more users within the LAN. MM may accept a
transferred message, provide a response generation window for the user
to input response message text, and transfer the response to the initiator
of the original message. Database storage for message storage and
retrieval, and review coordination in support ofmessage export are also
provided.
3. Message Text Format (MTF) Editor supports the creation of fully
formatted messages for transmission onto AUTODIN (i.e. outbound
message processing). Pre-designed message templates have been
incorporated, making it easy for the user to generate messages.
4. AMHS Server version 5.01 is support software for the TOPIC server
(located on the AMHS server). This must be installed on the server
only.
5. AMHS Client version 5.01 is support software for TOPIC interaction
by the client workstation(s). It must be installed on the system
administrators client workstation and should be installed an all other
client (user) workstations that use GCCS AMHS.
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6. AMHS Release Patches are software updates supplied by DISA which
include installation and operation notes detailing the changes and how
they affect system operation.
7. SAT/CBT software accepts and releases messages from the AUTODIN
Switching Center.
C. HARDWARE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE SSTL
The hardware requirements to operate GCCS AMHS in the SSTL are based on
the small site configuration. Except for the AUTODIN feed, the SSTL has the
required hardware onboard.
1. Sun Sparc20 or above running Solaris 2.3 - to serve as the AMHS
server, TOPIC Database Server.
2. Sun Sparc20 or above running Solaris 2.3 - to serve as a client
workstation for the Systems Administrator. A user workstation can
serve as this function.
3. 2 GB Hard Disk Space - to support up to 60 days archive and 1000
messages per day.
4. PC-386 or better (using MS DOS) to serve as the Standard Automated
Terminal/ Communications Support Processor Backside Terminal
(SAT/CBT).
5. CCPII AUTODIN interface card. This card, developed by Cavalier
Communications Inc., is installed in the SAT/CBT to perform the
necessary cryptology functions as the messages transition to and from
AUTODIN.
6. AUTODIN Feed capable of transferring 4800 bits per second.
The SSTL does not have the AUTODIN Feed, a designated dedicated PC, or
the CCPH AUTODIN interface card.
D. TECHNICAL SUPPORT
Technical assistance for AMHS can be obtained from a number of sources.
The Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) updates its AMHS documentation and forwards
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the information to all GCCS AMHS sites. DISA provides technical phone assistance
through its GCCS/AMHS division. The SSTL currently has access to these resources.
E. TRAINING
User and Administrator training is available through the 81st Training Group,
333rd Training Squadron at Keesler Air Force Base, Mississippi. The 333rd Training
Squadron conducts on-site training upon request. The command also developed the
GCCS AMHS Study Guide and Workbook [Ref. 10] which it disseminates to its
customers and is available in the SSTL. The SSTL currently has access to these
resources.
F. PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS
Ideally, a dedicated AMHS Systems Administrator should be assigned to
handle the daily operations, maintenance, and manual requirements of the system. In
the case of the SSTL, the GCCS systems administrator can serve as the AMHS
systems administrator due to the anticipated low volume of message traffic.8
8The SSTL currently has only one person who serves as GCCS manager, System
Administrator, Security Officer and other functions. Installation of an AMHS in the SSTL
may not be feasible until additional SSTL Personnel are in place.
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V. DMS REQUIREMENTS FOR THE SSTL
The specific software and hardware requirements for the SSTL to implement
DMS will be examined in this chapter. DMS is going through its final testing stages
therefore, the discussion that follows is written in future tense. The target date for the
first DoN operational DMS site is January 1997 with a DoN wide operational
implementation date of 1 January 2000. NPS is scheduled to have DMS operational
by January 1999. [Ref. 6]
A. GENERAL BACKGROUND
Messages that arrive over TCP/IP via the NPRNET at the SSTL will be
transmitted through the DMS infrastructure using X.400/X.500 protocols. DISA will
be responsible for installing, funding, and maintaining the main infrastructure of
DMS. The target infrastructure consists of the following components which are
shown in Figure 5. 1 and discussed in the following sections [Ref. 5]:
1
.
Message Transfer Agent (MTA): The MTA is an independent store and
forward message switch that will be responsible for handling the
routing and transferring of messages (referred to as "envelopes"). The
MTA will perform basic functions such as message receipt from a User
Agent (UA), Message Store (MS), or another MTA. The collection of
interconnected MTAs is referred to as the Message Transfer System
(MTS).
2. Message Store (MS): The MS is collocated with the local MTA. The
MS will receive and store messages when the UA is not available. The
MS can be configured to alert its UA when a message of a specified
type is received, and automatically forward it according to the
recipient's instructions.
3. Directory System Agent (DSA): the DSA will respond to queries for
directory information from Directory User Agents (DUA).
4. Mail List Agent (MLA): The MLA will support the distribution of
messages through the use of common mailing fists. MLAs will be
implemented locally and regionally (e.g., one MLA to serve the entire
European Theater.
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5. Multi-function Interpreter (MFI): The MFI is a transitional component
that will allow the MTS to exchange messages with users of legacy
messaging systems (e.g. AUTODIN).
6. Certification Authority Workstation (CAW): The PC-based CAW will
be used to program and maintain Fortezza Cards for users.
7. Secure Network Server (SNS): The SNS high-assurance guard will
control the exchange of messages to ensure that Classified information
does not leap beyond the walls of a high security network.
8. Administrative Directory User Agent (ADUA): The ADUA software
application will provide the directory administrator the ability to
modify, add, and delete DMS directory information.
9. Management Workstation (MWS): MWS is a software application that
will provide remote monitoring and control of all DMS products. It will
gather DMS system information globally. The MWS should be
implemented on a high performance UNIX or NT workstation.
SITE DMS BACKBONE INFRASTRUCTURE
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Figure 5.1. Representation of the DMS Goal Architecture
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Once the message transits through DISA's DMS infrastructure, it will arrive
at the SSTL. Specific hardware and software required in the SSTL to process DMS
organizational messages are discussed in the next section.
B. DMS SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS
At the organizational and individual user level, the following software is
required for DMS:
1. User Agent (UA): The UA application will reside on a PC or
workstation to provide the interface between the an individual user and
the MTS. The UA interacts directly with the user through a GUI to
create and edit a message. It will receive and display incoming message
content and assist the user in replying, forwarding, filing and retrieving
messages. The UA will interact with the MTA to perform security
validation in order to prevent unauthorized UA's from accessing the
MTS.
2. Directory User Agent (DUA): The DUA will provide directory services
for organizational and individual messages. Additionally, the DUA will
provide user authentication and local caching of directory information.
All directory services will be provided to DMS users and components
(e.g. UA, MLA, and MFI) through DUAs.
3. Profiling User Agent (PUA): The PUA is an enhanced UA that will
have the primary purpose of receiving messages from an MTA on
behalf of organizational users. The original message will be both
delivered to and received by the PUA. Once the PUA determines the
appropriate recipients to receive the message, it will resubmit copies of
the message to the MTS for subsequent delivery. The PUA will
redistribute the messages based on key words or phrases in the subject,
priority, or message content.
The UA and DUA will be installed at the SSTL and NPS level while the PUA
is an NPS only level component.
C. HARDWARE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE SSTL
1. Workstations/PCs: UNIX-based workstations or PC 486-66 SX or DX
(or higher) to house the DMS software applications. DMS components
can be installed on all or selected PCs or workstations [Ref 5].
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2. 16 MB RAM, 500 MB hard drive: This is the minimum requirement
for DMS software recommended by the DoN DMS Program
Management Office (PMO). Other applications (word processing,
spreadsheets, etc.) currently installed on a PC must be considered when
determining RAM and hard drive capacity.
3. Dual slot Type II Personal Computer Memory Card International
Association (PCMCIA) card reader: The PCMCIA card reader will be
installed on all DMS workstations/PCs to read the Fortezza security
cards (explained below).
4. Fortezza Card: The Fortezza card is a cryptographic plug-in card that
will provide authentication of a DMS user's identity and access
privileges. The credit card sized Fortezza card, which contains its own
processor and memory, will be used in conjunction with a personal
identification number (PIN). Current plans are for DISA to provide all
DMS users with Fortezza cards.
D. TECHNICAL SUPPORT
The DMS Program Management Office (PMO) operates under the Space and
Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR 152). The DMS PMO's Infrastructure
Division will provide technical support for all Navy activities and commands.
Vendors will also provide software assistance as needed. NPS technical support is in
the planning stages under the direction of the Computer Information Systems
Department [Ref. 11].
E. TRAINING
DMS training curriculum and requirements are being developed through a
DMS contractor under the guidance of DISA. Part of DISA's training mission is to
provide flexibility that will allow individual commands and services to tailor training
requirements to meet their specific needs. There are many options available to SSTL
DMS users. The current training plan offered by DISA consists ofvideo self-teaching
and on-line help facilities. A Basic User Training course developed by DISA will
also be available at designated Chief of Naval Education and Training (CNET)
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training facilities or on site by mobile training teams [Ref. 7 ]. Detailed DoN training
will be included in the DoN DMS Training Plan which will be published at a later
date [Ref. 6].
F. PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS
At the installation site level, staff will be selected to support operations,
maintenance, admhiistration, security administration, functional messaging
application administration, and user assistance [Ref. 5]. This staff will come from
NPS as an organization rather than SSTL designated staff. However, due to the
unique nature ofthe GCCS system in the SSTL and its interface with DMS, the SSTL
systems administrator should be considered part of the NPS support staff and receive
appropriate training [Ref. 13].
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VI. FUNCTIONAL COMPARISON OF MESSAGING TECHNOLOGIES
The preceding chapters of this study have served as an introduction to current
and emerging communication technologies. In this chapter, AMHS and DMS
functionalities are compared to the DoD's formal requirements for message
communication.
A. BACKGROUND
In 1988, the Department of Defense outlined formal requirements and
guidelines to develop a message communications system that is responsive to mission
requirements and offered at reduced cost to the Services and Defense agencies. These
requirements were defined in a joint service and agency forum and detailed in the
Multi-command Required Operational Capability (MROC 3-88) [Ref. 14]. In this
chapter, GCCS AMHS and DMS are compared based on the requirements and
guidelines outlined in MROC 3-88.
1. MROC 3-88 Requirements
During the development of the MROC 3-88, no specific system was named.
The new system, based on MROC 388 requirements, must be centered around the
principles of standardization and interoperability, while preserving adaptability for
implementing service and agency unique functionality and customization. [Ref. 15]
(1) Connectivity/Interoperabihty - Allows the user to communicate with
any other user within the DoD community as well as other federal
agencies, allies, tactical, and defense contractors. System users may be
fixed, mobile, or transportable.
(2) Guaranteed Delivery/ Accountability - Deliver to the intended recipient
with a high degree of certainty. Provide prompt notification of non-
delivery to sender. Maintain writer to reader accountability.
(3) Timely delivery - Recognize messages that require preferential
handling subject to traffic loads, conditions, and precedence.
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(4) Confidentiality/ Security - Preclude access to or release of information
to unauthorized recipients according to their security level and
sensitivity.
(5) Sender authentication - Verify that information marked as originating
at a given source actually originated there. Verify message is approved
by competent authority before transmission.
(6) Integrity - Ensure information received is the same as information sent.
(7) Survivability - The system does not degrade the survivability of
systems interfaced to it.
(8) Availability/Rehability - Provide users with continuous message
service achieved by a combination of highly reliable and readily
maintainable components, thoroughly tested software, and necessary
operational procedures.
(9) Ease ofUse - The system flexibility and responsiveness should allow
user operation without extensive training.
(10) Identification of Recipients - The sender can unambiguously identify
the intended recipient organizations or individuals.
(11) Message Preparation Support - Support user-friendly preparation of
messages for transmission.
(12) Storage and Retrieval Support - Support storing messages after delivery
to allow retrieval for such purposes as readdressal, retransmission, and
other functions such as archiving and analysis. The system should also
have the capability of incorporating segments into future messages.
(13) Distribution Determination and Delivery - Determine the destination of
— each message and effect delivery in accordance with the requirements
of the recipient organization.
B. COMPARISON TO MROC 3-88 REQUIREMENTS
Table 6.1 compares GCCS AMHS and DMS to the requirements of MROC
3-88 [Refs. 4,7,15]. Because the emphasis of this thesis is on organizational
messaging, E-mail is not included in the table, but it will be discussed later in section
E.l of this chapter.
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User can send and receive
AUTODIN messages only.
User will send DMS
organizational and individual
messages and receive AUTODIN




delivery and nondelivery must be
audited by the SA who will send
notification over the LAN to the
sender.
Delivery/Nondelivery notification
will be automated. The UA audits
the log of sent messages for
delivery/ nondelivery
notifications.
Timely Delivery AMHS uses a Topic tree based
on Topic precedence rules to
queue messages. Once the
message is released, AUTODIN
precedence rules apply
UA will queue a message
according to precedence levels.
The MTA and MFI will deliver






SAT/CBT therefore, messages in
the AMHS are in ASCII text
(readable). Uses DAC to protect
against unauthorized access. SA
adds, modifies and deletes DAC
groups for a user.
Messages will be encrypted by
the sender and can only be
decrypted by the intended
recipient using the Fortezza card.
Fortezza cards will contain
security classification labels for
users.
Sender Authentication Messages are released to the
SAT/CBT through the MM
Release function by the person
with releasing authority.
Messages will be released at the
releasing authority's UA
Integrity Comeback copies9 of a
successfully transmitted message
are delivered to the drafter, those
in the routing chain, and the
releaser of the message.
MISSI services will detect
unauthorized changes to a
messages content.
9Comeback copies are "as transmitted" copies of messages released to and accepted
by AUTODIN through the SAT/CBT.
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Survivability AMHS depends on survivability
ofAUTODIN. AUTODINuses
redundant inter-switch routing
(under the control ofASC
operators) to survive. Survival
relies on connections of selected
AUTODIN terminals and
AMPEs to multiple ASCs
Survivability will depend on the
base level/long haul networks.
Routing/rerouting between
MTAs will be automated to




AMHS provides 24 hour, seven




message storage redundancy to
achieve reliability.
DMS is designed to provide 24
hour, seven days a week message
delivery service for DMS and
AUTODIN users. DMS will use
redundant workstations or back-
ups to achieve reliability at the
infrastructure level.
Ease ofUse All software components use
COTS and GOTS windows
based applications. One day
training for users is available.
SA is available to help users.
All software components will use
COTS and GOTS windows
based applications.
One day training and user help
desk will be available.
Identification of
Recipients
Users access the PLA drop-down
menu to choose desired PLA. If
PLA is not available in menu, the
SA must update the PLA table.
DUA will provide user with
correct Address. If address
cannot be obtained from the users
DUA, the DUA will access the




Uses MTF editor to assist in
messages preparation
.
UA applications will assist in
message preparation.
Storage and Retrieval Support Messages are stored on the
AMHS server and are retrieved
using Topic Query Database.
UA will store messages on the
users PC or client account. The
UA will also provide retrieval
support for the user.
Distribution Determination and
Delivery
The AMHS delivers a single
message to multiple addresses
specified in the originators
message.
The MLA will support UAs in
delivering a single message to
multiple recipients.
The MLA will perform the
security functions for the UA.
30
C. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN GCCS AMHS AND DMS RELATIVE
TO THE SSTL
GCCS AMHS and DMS functions provide the user with paperless, automated
means to receive and send message traffic. While there are many similarities between
the two systems, it is the differences that make DMS a more desirable system for the
SSTL. These differences are addressed in terms ofpersonnel support, equipment, and
message format standards.
1. Personnel Support
For GCCS AMHS in the SSTL, a single person is required to perform as the
systems administrator (SA) and the systems operator. DMS will eliminate most of the
message handling responsibilities of the SSTL's system administrator (SA). Some of
the functions will be automated and other functions will become the responsibility at
the level of DMS that is transparent to the user i.e., NPS or above responsibility.
Some of the more laborious functions are discussed below.
a. Directory Services
The GCCS AMHS SA is responsible for insuring the address directory
that allows the user to choose recipients from the pull down menu is up-to-date. The
SA must add, delete or modify addresses in the directory and, if needed or requested
by a user, search for the address in the Message Address Directory (MAD). 10
DMS address directory system updates are the responsibility of the
DISA infrastructure. Addresses will be stored for X.400(DMS) in PLA format. In
addition, the DUA will assist the user in an automated search for addresses by request
or browse functions.
10TheMAD contains organization names and associated PLAs. This ACP 1 17 series
of publications included PLAs with assigned RI (routing indicator) listings [Ref. 7].
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b. Local Security
The GCCS SA is responsible for maintaining and monitoring the DAC
list. Using the DAC Manager application, the SA assigns control groups to a user
based on information obtained from the Security Manager.
With DMS, the Certification Authority Workstation (CAW), a special
purpose trusted workstation managed by NPS personnel, will be used for network
security management functions. These functions include creating certificates that
indicate a user's authorizations (individual messaging and/or organizational
messaging release), precedence, classifications, and other security information.
c Non-Recipient Message Delivery
All AUTODIN messages received in the GCCS AMHS must be
delivered to a human for disposition. In some cases, non-delivery of a message could
occur if the users TOPIC queries are not robust enough to ensure a legitimate
destination for a message [Ref. 4]. If the SA has set up a dead letter file, the TOPIC
Query's profiler feature will deliver messages not profiled to a specific user to the
file. The SA must decide which user to route the message to based on local policy
or the SA's judgement. The SA must also know whether or not the user is authorized
to see the message, since the routing procedure does not preserve DAC controls. If
a dead letter file is not set-up, then the message will be dropped, unread, into the
message database.
DMS messages must also be delivered to a human for disposition. The
Profiling User Agent (PUA) will act as the organization's message dissemination
system. It will typically be implemented on an NPS managed workstation (along with
other organizational messaging applications) designated to accept messages on behalf
of the organization [Ref. 5]. The PUA will automatically examine each incoming
message and determine its dissemination based on information that may be contained
in the heading or body of the body of the message. Once the PUA determines the
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proper recipients, it resubmits copies (based on the number of authorized profiles) of
the message to the MTS. The MTS will deliver the message to the appropriate
recipients. Since all DMS messages are encrypted and decrypted by a Fortezza card,
the MTS can only deliver messages to authorized recipients. Any message that is
undeliverable to a human will result in a notification of non-delivery to the originator.
d. Systems Monitoring and Maintenance
In addition to the tasks discussed above, the GCCS AMHS SA is
responsible for monitoring system activities, maintaining numerous system files,
directing backups, performing restores, and overseeing the overall AMHS operations.
Additional tasks include [Ref. 7]:
1. Monitoring operations - monitors system activities, periodically
monitors disk utilization and the status of the network/interface, and
reconfigure file systems as needed to optimize performance.
2. Mamtaining system files - generates user account reports, load tapes,
maintain message archive, profile information and system performance.
3. Directing backups - determines backup requirements and initiates
backups.
4. Implementing security procedures - maintains the TOPIC password file.
5. Controlling system configuration - monitors and maintains a log of all
software and hardware changes to the system.
6. SAT/CBT Operation/Admimstration - oversees the operation and
maintenance ofthe SAT/CBT PC and is the primary interface with the
NTCC on AUTODIN traffic issues.
The DMS Management Workstation (MWS), managed by NPS will automate
many of the tasks performed by the GCCS AMHS SA. The MWS is part of the DMS
topology that consist of three levels of management [Ref. 1,14]:
Global - A global control center will manage the operational control,
monitoring, and configuring on a system-wide basis.
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Regional - Regional control centers will manage infrastructure components in
the Western Hemisphere (DMS-WESTHEM), Europe (DMS-EUR), and the
Pacific (DMS-PAC).
Local - Local control centers will manage components at sites chosen by a
Service or agency. LCCs may manage one installation or several installations
in a metropolitan area. For example, an LCC for Monterey would service NPS
and tenant commands, POM and tenant commands, Coast Guard Station, and
Fleet Numeric. These functions will be performed for the SSTL at a higher
level ofDMS architecture.
All control centers will have at least one MWS. At the LCC, the MWS will
provide for the SSTL monitoring and control of local DMS components, accounting,
security management, system administration, auditing, user account maintenance and
customer service.
2. Equipment
As discussed in Chapters IV and V, GCCS AMHS and DMS require different
equipment. For implementation in the SSTL, GCCS AMHS is installed with a
server, a dedicated PC (for the SAT/CBT), the CCPH AUTODIN interface card and
an AUTODIN feed. The system also requires the MM, MTF Editor, Topic, and
AMHS applications and the GCCS COE.
For basic implementation in the SSTL
,
DMS has a smaller equipment list.
DMS requires a card reader (internal or external) for each workstation/PC and
Fortezza Cards for each DMS authorized user, the UA/DUA software for each
workstation/PC, and the NIPRNET access.
3. Message Format Standards
The AUTODIN system provides for the transmission of three types of message
format headers: (1) DD173, (2) JANAP 128, and (3)ACP 126 [Ref. 4]. The GCCS
AMHS allows the user to author a message, using the MTF Editor, in any one of the
three formats. The body ofthe messages can be drafted using either the MTF Editor
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or the APPLIX text editor that is installed with GCCS. In any case, all AUTODIN
messages must use ASCII text.
DMS when fully implemented will use only one message format header called
Military Message. In addition, the message body may consist ofASCII text, graphics,
videotext, and/or digitized voice.
D. SECURITY ISSUES
There is no question that AUTODIN is a secure system. As a Multi-level
Secure (MLS) network it provides message service all security levels (from
unclassified to Top Secret). The intention of DMS, in its transitional stage, is to
maintain the existing level of security and, at full implementation, improve security.
Security is provided by the Multi-level Information System Security Initiative
(MISSI) components which provides Information Security support for DMS. The
objective of MISSI is to achieve MLS capability for automated information
processing systems in phases. Phase I, Sensitive-But-Unclassified (SBU) message
security, is currently available using untrusted workstations and the Fortezza Card.
The SECRET message security capability (Phase U) is expected to be available after
July 1997. This capability will be achieved using the Fortezza+(plus) card. The
TS/SCI capability is expected to be available after July 1998. TS/SCI traffic will run
on the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) backbone
[Ref. 6].
Initially, DMS will process SBU organizational messages only [Ref. 6].
System High Networks such as AUTODIN or SEPRNET will continue to process
secret level information until the DMS goal architecture is achieved.
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E. CONNECTIVITY ISSUES
Connectivity of all DoD communications systems has been the driving force
behind the establishment DISA and its role as the DoD services and agencies
information systems headquarters.
1. Electronic Mail (E-mail)
One of the MROC 3-88 requirements is connectivity of organizational and
individual messaging (E-mail). In the current E-mail environment, a large command
may have many E-mail systems in use which are not all compatible with one another,
(e.g., the Pentagon has 49 different E-mail systems currently in use [Ref. 16].
GCCS AMHS does not provide individual E-mail through AUTODIN.
However, up to SECRET individual E-mail is provide as a GCCS application of the
SffRNET.
One of the objectives ofDMS is the support of individual E-mail. DMS will
provide organizational and individual messaging using the X.400/X.500 protocols.
All E-mail applications must be DMS compliant.
2. GCCS
GCCS AMHS was developed to be integrated into the GCCS COE and as such
it is treated as a component of GCCS. DMS on the other hand is considered a value
added service. A value added service relies on information infrastructure to provide
information processing and information transport services. Value Added Services
cross functional and organizational boundaries giving them the capability to interface
with different communications systems like GCCS, Global Command Support System
(GCSS), INTELINK, and other current and emerging DEI functional applications.
3. The Defense Information Infrastructure (DII)
Currently, the DoD does not have an integrated information infrastructure.
Local systems and their interconnecting networks are separated by levels of
classification. GCCS and AUTODIN are pieces in the collection. The GCCS AMHS
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use of the GCCS COE integrates the two systems. However, they cannot interface
currently with other systems. The infrastructure is fragmented by multiple "stovepipe"
systems that inhibit interoperability, fail to provide links between the battlefield and
the power projection support base, and has no means of connecting to the U.S.
Industrial Base.
The goal of DL1 is to operate as a collection of distributed heterogeneous
information systems by the year 2000. Applications within the DEI will range from
centrally developed DoD applications implemented at central locations to base-level
or end-user applications residing on the desktop or in tactical environments [Ref 17].
Under the DII master plan, GCCS and DMS will be part of the heterogeneous
system with AUTODIN and GCCS AMHS considered legacy systems and therefore
are to be merged into or replaced by DII.
4. Interoperability
GCCS AMHS as an AUTODIN front end system cannot provide
interoperability between U.S. allies and Federal agencies. DMS is designed to
provide interoperability through the use of the Multi-Function Interpreter (MFI). In
addition DMS will maintain interoperability with AUTODIN systems and its different
formats until the phase-out is complete.
5. AUTODIN
AUTODIN is the backbone system for GCCS AMHS. In 1993, NTCC
Monterey closed its doors. On 9 March 1995, the Assistant Secretary of Denfense
(C3I) mandated the closing ofAUTODIN by 31 December 1999 [Ref. 6]. These two
events make it difficult, if not impossible, for the SSTL to implement a fully
functional GCCS AMHS that is cost effective over time. AUTODIN capabilities on
the Monterey Peninsula area have not been readily available to NPS since 1993. To
attempt to establish that capability would require the LAC to justify spending money
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on a system that has been ordered closed. DMS is the replacement for AUTODIN
and its front end systems.
F. CONCLUSION
Comparatively, DMS is a better system than GCCS AMHS, but is not
scheduled for NPS implementation until January 1999. GCCS AMHS has the
advantage over DMS in that the system has been tested, it is operational in many
commands, and software is installed, although not fully functional, because of lack
ofAUTODIN connectivity, in the SSTL. GCCS AMHS is used in the SSTL as an
internal training system. Users can draft messages and route them through the AMHS
but they cannot release or receive messages through AUTODIN.
Although it is still evolving, DMS is designed to accommodate legacy systems
such as AUTODIN and front end systems such as GCCS AMHS. Unfortunately,
DMS local level infrastructure is not scheduled for installation at NPS until December
1998 with operational capability in January 1999 [Ref. 6]. Initial DMS
implementation at sites prior to July 1997 11 will require those organizations to receive
SBU DMS products to send and receive unclassified messages only via the DISN.
Existing AUTODIN components will continue to send and receive classified
messages. The SSTL will have to wait until January 1999 when DMS is scheduled to
be fully operational at NPS and has the capability to process SECRET messages [Ref.
6]. Under the circumstances, because AUTODIN installation is infeasible, the SSTL
has no choice but to wait for DMS.
"Completion date ofDMS SECRET IOC testing.
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VH. DMS ACQUISITION STRATEGY AND PROCUREMENT COSTS
FOR THE SSTL
This chapter examines the DMS acquisition strategy and possible procurement
costs for the SSTL. GCCS AMHS and AUTODIN as legacy systems are not
discussed. This chapter is based on a draft version of the DoN DMS Master Plan (for
DMS implementation) that forecast costs out to 1999.
A. DMS ACQUISITION STRATEGY
The DMS program employs an acquisition strategy designed to influence
development of COTS products while mamtaining maximum competition and
acquisition flexibility. Vendors are encouraged to provide COTS solutions to meet
DoD's messaging, directory service, security, and service management requirements.
Establishment of a separate DMS compliant testing environment will ensure COTS
products satisfy DMS functional, security, performance, conformance, and
interoperability requirements. The testing environment will allow any vendor to
submit products for DMS compliance certification. Once certified, these products
will be placed on a list of DMS certified products available for purchase by the
Services and Agencies [Ref. 18]. The intention of the DMS acquisition strategy is
to provide DoD Agencies maximum acquisition flexibility and cost savings resulting
from competition and large quantity purchases.
The DMS primary acquisition contract type, indefinite delivery/indefinite
quantity (IDIQ), allows the Services, Agencies, and DISA to procure DMS compliant
products and services deemed necessary to achieve the target DMS architecture [Ref.
19].
The following section covers DMS procurement policy as it applies to DISA,




DISA is responsible for procuring hardware and software products (MTA,
MWS, MFI, DSA, etc.) and support services necessary to engineer, integrate, plan,
deploy, implement, and maintain/manage the DMS infrastructure. Hardware and
software maintenance and operation ofDMS infrastructure will be funded through the
Defense Business Operating Fund (DBOF) through a rate structure which began in
FY 1996. All infrastructure orders from the Services and Agencies will be processed
through the DISA DMS Program Management Office [Ref. 19].
2. Navy Policy
The DoN DMS Program Management Office was established under the Space
and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR 152) to provide DMS planning and
coordmating for the Navy and Marine Corps and resolve the implementation
challenges associated with DMS. Funding requirements for procurement, engineering
and installation, training, maintenance, and operation of user components at the LCC
levels, are the responsibility of the Navy.
The DoN DMS PMO is responsible for centrally funding and acquiring each
DoN activity's one enabling capability for organizational messaging to include
products and services such as the CAW, security software and devices (Fortezza cards
and card readers) a UA/DUA, and a PUA. This enabling capability will allow each
activity to send and receive official messaging and E-mail through the DMS.
DoN DMS PMO policy require commands to fund their own firewalls, router,
workstations, and upgrades for LAN infrastructure. DMS extension to the desktop
(hardware and software) is the responsibility of each command. The decision has not
been made if usage fees for DISN will be centrally funded or billed back to the
command [Ref. 20].
The DON PMO will assist commands in determining DMS requirements based
on the results of a User Site Survey. Once determined, the users will present their
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user-based product ordering requirements to the PMO. The PMO will submit users
ordering and DON infrastructure requirements to DISA and, after review, DISA will
submit the order to the Air Force PMO who serves as the Central Ordering Office.
The Contracting Office accepts the orders from the DMS-AF PMO and negotiates
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Figure 7.1. DMS Products and Services Ordering Process
An important feature of the DMS ordering system is that commands will be
able to track the status of their order, through NCTAMSLANT's WWW homepage
as it passes through the system.
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3. NPS Policy
Commands are responsible for funding and extending messaging capabilities
to individuals within their activity via their LANs. NPS, under the direction of the
Assistant Provost for Computer Information Systems (Code 05) is in the process of
upgrading and restructuring its LANs to make them compatible with each other [Ref.
21]. Currently, there is no complete NPS initiated DMS implementation plan [Ref.
1 1]. According to The DoN DMS Master Plan [Ref. 6], NPS is scheduled for its first
site survey from September through December 1997 and the NPS Implementation
Plan is scheduled to be completed and forwarded to the DMS PMO no later than 28
February 1998. In anticipation of DMS, part of the NPS strategy is to build the
X.400/X.500 capability into the NPS wide backbone LAN [Ref. 1 1]. Funding at the
NPS level has not been officially budgeted at this time.
4. Implications of Acquisition Policies for the SSTL
Due to the scheduled December 1998 installation ofDMS at NPS, it is not
surprising that there is currently no specific acquisition policy for DMS products at
NPS. Until DMS site surveys are completed for NPS (the last of two site surveys is
scheduled to be complete by 28 February 1998), the SSTL can only prepare to state
its requirements using the DMS Draft Master Plan.
B. SSTL DMS PROCUREMENT COSTS
As the Initial Operational Test and Evaluation and Component Approval
Process comes to a close, there are procurement options now available to the SSTL.
The SSTL can purchase current commercial (i.e., non-DMS) versions of products
either from the DMS contract or from local software outlets. Products purchased
from the contract will receive vendor provided DMS upgrades for five dollars per
product [Ref. 20].
It is difficult to develop a specific procurement plan and calculate life cycle
cost without the benefit of a User Site Survey. The first NPS site survey, the
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Engineering Field Activity (EFA) 12 survey, is scheduled for September through
December 1997. The last survey (Loral product survey) is scheduled for February
1998. The procurement costs discussed in the following sections can be found in the
Loral Product ordering Guide. Products and Services discussed are based on DMS
requirements for the SSTL.
1. Hardware
The SSTL will use existing workstations or PCs, 13 which are connected to the
SSTL's systems high LAN (SIPRNET), for its DMS model. The SSTL has 8
SunSparc workstations and 6 PCs connected to its LAN.
The SSTL's classified LAN will be electronically connected to the NPS
unclassified (NIPRNET) LAN, therefore it will require installation of a high
assurance guard, such as a Secure Network Server (SNS). Since the high security
guard is considered part of the NPS infrastructure, the SSTL should not incur the
expense of an SNS purchase. Figure 7.2 shows this connectivity.
12The EFA Implementation teams will provide technical direction at all levels ofthe
DoN DMS such as conducting infrastructure assessments, conducting site surveys,
developing plans, overseeing installation and configuration management, and conducting
fielding conferences. [Ref. 6]
13 According to MR.James Garry, NCTS San Diego, DMS Program Manager (N5),





























Figure 7.2. DoN DMS Security Architecture
2. Software
Commands are required to purchase any additional UA/DUAs 14 required to
bring DMS to the desktop.
(a) IfNPS purchases all UA/DUAs then there will be no cost to the SSTL
the additional software.
(b) If the SSTL is responsible for purchasing the additional UA/DUAs for
each workstation then the cost would be as follows [Ref. 19]:
UA/DUA for UNDC: product UA004 ESL $44 each X 8 = $352
UA/DUA for Windows: product UA002 ESL $44 each X 6 = $284
$636
14TheUA and DUA is combined into one software package and will be sold as such.
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3. Maintenance
DMS component maintenance will be centrally funded. Network funding is
the responsibility ofNPS in accordance with the pending NPS DMS policy.
4. Training
Initially, training will be centrally funded by the DoN. Eventually, user
training will be conducted by LCC staff. In chapter V it was mentioned that the
GCCS SA should receive training beyond the user level for DMS. The DMS
Orientation course will provide the GCCS SA with an overview of the DMS program,
its objectives and its technology to NPS designated staff. This particular course is
part of the DMS Fielding Conference which is scheduled for NPS in January 1998.
[Ref. 6]
5. Technical Support
Technical support for DMS hardware and software will be provided by the
LCC's and the software vendors (in accordance with their DMS contracts). Technical
support for the command LANs will be the responsibility ofNPS in accordance with
pending NPS DMS policy. DISA will also man help desk to provide technical support
for user customers [Ref. 12].
6. Personnel
Manning requirements for the SSTL will remain unchanged, therefore costs for
additional personnel will not be incurred.
The SSTL will have to incur the expense of the absence of the SA while
attending the four day DMS Orientation Course. Since this course will be held




As discussed in Chapter VI, GCCS AMHS has the advantage over DMS in that
the system has been tested, it is currently operational throughout DoD, and the
applications are installed in the SSTL. However, GCCS AMHS is not fully
functional, in the SSTL, due to the lack ofAUTODIN connectivity. The DoN DMS
Master Plan has AUTODIN scheduled for complete closure no later than 31
December 1999.
Although it is still evolving (as all technologies should), DMS is the better
system for the SSTL. DMS requires less equipment, automates more processes, and
provides better security of messages than GCCS AMHS. DMS is designed to
accommodate legacy systems such as AUTODIN and front end systems such as
GCCS AMHS. Under the circumstances, because AUTODIN installation is
infeasible, the SSTL has no choice but to wait for DMS.
As DISA begins to implement DMS at the command levels, users must be
prepared to adapt to the changes DMS will bring in order to reap its benefits This
chapter will discuss the benefits ofDMS implementation in the NPS SSTL and the
cultural changes that will affect all DMS users.
A. BENEFITS OF DMS IMPLEMENTATION IN THE SSTL
This section discusses compatibility, adaptability, interoperability, training,
and costs as major benefits ofDMS implementation in the SSTL.
1. Compatibility
One ofthe key objectives ofDMS is to make available to the user, compatible
hardware and software products. The DMS-compliant certification program ensures
that vendors products remain compatible with the system. The certification program
will aid the SSTL in selecting vendors products based on the lab's own criteria (e.g.,
price, product functionality, ease of use, reputation).
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2. Adaptability
DMS is designed to be flexible enough to adapt to the rapidly changing
technology that is characteristic ofthe computer industry. The use of COTS products
is encouraged to promote competition. With competition comes new technologies
and capabilities for the DMS, as long as evolving technologies can be DMS certified.
For the SSTL, emerging technology may include development ofDMS products that
have features tailored specifically for GCCS.
3. Interoperability
DII is the DoD's answer to ensure interoperability between its services,
agencies, and U.S. allies. For the SSTL, this means that DMS will operate with
GCCS and any other C4I systems it may later acquire that use the DII COE.
4. Training
DMS will be used DoD-wide and therefore, all service members must learn to
use the system. CNET is reviewing many options to train all Navy personnel as DMS
users. These options include assigning DMS basic user courses as part of the
standard transfer order process, providing each LCC with a trainer who would
conduct DMS user training for base level commands, or the use of computer based
training. As DMS use becomes more extensive in the Navy, the SSTL will see more
previously trained users. Users will be able to spend less time learning DMS more
time training to use GCCS's other applications.
5. Costs
DMS will allow the SSTL to spend its funding on other areas of the lab. DISA
and the DoN will fund the infrastructure, including DMS specific hardware and
software requirements. NPS will fund LAN upgrade and connectivity expenses. This
infrastructure will relieve the SSTL of the cost related to mamtaining and monitoring
the GCCS AMHS. DMS funding at the NPS level is still in the planning stages,
therefore it is unclear as to what cost, if any, the SSTL will have to incur.
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The implementation ofDMS will also eliminate the cost of time the GCCS SA
must commit to perform additional duties as the AMHS administrator and operator.
B. CULTURAL CHANGES
Technology changes bring about cultural changes as well. DMS is no
exception. In an interview with Lieutenant General Edmonds, 15 when asked the
question "What do you see as the main roadblock to timely implementation?" he
replied:
In two words, user acceptance. Any time we introduce a new
technology, people must change their work habits, their way of thinking
about who they are and what they do and how they get their work done.
In short, user acceptance is difficult any time it requires a cultural
change, and it takes some time to get it introduced.... DMS will
provide organizations with the capability to prepare, coordinate,
release, transmit, receive, and distribute organizational messages
electronically. DMS will eliminate the requirement for specially skilled
communications personnel to manually handle each message. Users
must understand this new capability and determine how it can best be
used in their organizations to improve productivity.
Some ofthe specific cultural changes that will occur with the implementation
ofDMS include:
• Carrying the Fortezza card will become as important as carrying a
Military ID card.
•
""* Standardized Message Formats will eliminate the guess-work and
conflicts that often occur in joint commands.
• Departments within organizations or commands will be responsible for
transmitting their own organizational messages.
• Individuals will be able to send classified E-mail to users within DoD
and the government worldwide as a matter of routine
15LTG Edmonds is the Director ofDISA and Manager, National Communications
System (NCS). He is responsible for providing C4IFTW support. His interview can be found
on page 5 of [Ref. 23].
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After years of planning, testing, and talking, the DoD is moving faster and
closer to making the Defense Message System a reality. Selected sites are scheduled
to transition to DMS starting January 1997. NPS is scheduled to be fully operational
by January 1999. Detailed yet easy to implement transition strategies, patience, and
optimistic cooperation between DISA, the DoN PMO and NPS will improve our
ability to take advantage of DMS. The remainder of this study discusses ways in
which NPS can make use of time until NPS DMS implementation, areas of further
study, and closing remarks.
A. WAITING FOR DMS
The mandated AUTODIN phase-out gives the SSTL no choice but to wait for
DMS. The Navy's DMS PMO will coordinate AUTODIN ASC closure with the
implementation ofDMS at NPS. Detailed plans and coordination between NPS and
the PMO are required to ensure a steady transition. While NPS waits for the DoN
DMS PMO to finalize its DMS fielding schedule (with the final approval of DISA,
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the CINCs), the SSTL could take the following
action:
Seek representation for input to the NPS DMS Implementation Plan.
Propose the SSTL as the NPS test site or "first to receive" site for the
implementation ofDMS SECRET message capability (i.e., Fortezza+
cards).
Plan for absorbing DMS overhead duties into SSTL manning Plan.
Decide where and how DMS architecture will co-reside with existing
SEPRNET and SECRET LAN.
Decide how many UA's to make available as DMS stations.
Decide how many Fortezza users to support.
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Once DMS is operational in the SSTL, the IAC could propose the SSTL's
GCCS site as a research facility for GCCS/DMS interoperability projects and test site
for new GCCS/DMS capabilities. This facility would be available for DISA, DoN,
and NPS research or test and evaluation activities.
B. AREAS OF FURTHER STUDY
This thesis focused on the examination of GCCS AMHS and DMS and their
interoperability with GCCS in an effort to determine the feasibility of the two
messaging technologies for the SSTL. As technologies that are designed to evolve
with changing technology, DMS and GCCS provide other areas for further study:
1. DMS and GCCS mobile capability. What are the roles of GCCS and
DMS in the DII tactical/theater context? In transit (on ships)? Mobility
for Marines?
2. Multi-level security for GCCS and DMS. How will multi-level
security evolve to provide the required level of security for DMS and
GCCS? Is the security tamper proof? Will there be a single security
product (i.e. one type of Fortezza card) adequate enough to provide
protection for DMS?
3. GCCS and the DH COE. What changes must occur for GCCS to
adopt the DH COE? When are these changes scheduled to take place?
What version ofGCCS is expected to incorporate these changes? What
does it mean for the SSTL?
4. DMS policy for the SSTL. As a classified enclave, will the SSTL
"need to establish its own Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) or will
NPS set the policy? What will be required of the GCCS systems
administrator? What criteria will be used to assign users Fortezza+
cards?
C. CLOSING REMARKS
The goal of this thesis is to present the SSTL with an analysis of two
messaging technologies for the Global Command and Control System and the
circumstances that make one (DMS) dominant, in terms of selection, over the other.
Although neither systems are currently available for implementation in the SSTL, the
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recommendation for DMS is heavily influenced by the fact that DMS is the target
architecture for the DoD's messaging capability while GCCS AMHS (and its reliance
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